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Does feudalism have a role 
in 21st century land law?
by Charles Harpum
The author, a Law Commissioner for England and Wales, argues 
that, following the example of the Bill to abolish feudal tenure now 
before the Scottish Parliament, it is time for major reform of the 
relics of feudalism still prevailing in English law.
T here is before the Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh at present a very important Bill, the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Bill. It is intended to implement 
the Scottish Law Commission's 'Report on Abolition of the 
Feudal System' ((1999) Scot Law Com No. 168). It is largely the 
work of Professor Ken Reid, who has responsibility for properly 
law at the Scottish Law Commission. As the title of the Bill 
suggests, it will abolish the feudal system as it applies in 
Scotland. The thesis of this article is that an equivalent piece of 
legislation is needed for England and Wales, though for rather 
different reasons. It begins with an explanation of what remains 
of feudalism in English law. This remnant has absolutely no 
connection whatever with the logic of feudalism as it developed, 
and cannot be justified. Many lawyers consider that the 
surviving aspects of feudalism are quaint and harmless relics 
from the past and should be left alone. In fact, as this article 
attempts to demonstrate, what remains of feudalism does no 
good and a great deal of harm. It is concerned with the two 
main relics of feudalism   the Crown's ultimate residual 
'paramount lordship' and the doctrine of escheat. There is no 
attempt to engage in a scholarly discourse on the nature of 
either. It is enough to set out the principal elements of the law, 
which have been drawn from the standard sources (such as 
Challis).
THE CROWN'S PARAMOUNT LORDSHIP
As Lord Coke explained in his celebrated Commentary on 
Littleton's Tenures (1628):
'all the lands within this realm were originally derived from the 
crown, and therefore, the king is sovereign, or lord paramount, either 
mediate or immediate, of all and every parcel oj land within the realm.' 
(Co Litt 6 5 a)
Originally, there was a 'feudal pyramid' in this country. In 
other words, all land was vested in the king who granted land to 
his tenants in chief in return for services   a process called 
'infeudation'. Those tenants in chief in turn made 
subinfeudatorv grants to their followers in exchange for
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services, and those followers further subinfeudatcd, and so on. 
Lords further down the feudal pyramid were called 'mesne' or 
intermediate lords. In other words, the only way of disposing of 
land was to grant it in return for services. The statute Quia 
Emptores 1290, which is still on the statute book, abolished the 
practice of subinfeudation. It prohibits feudal grants to tenants 
in fee simple in exchange for services. The only way in which 
freehold land could thereafter be transferred was by a 
substitutionary grant. Thus if A was B's feudal tenant, and 
wanted to transfer land to C, he could no longer subinfeudate to 
C, creating another rung in the feudal ladder. Instead, C would 
be substituted for A as B's feudal tenant. The statute Quia 
Emptores did not bind the Crown. It could not, because the 
Crown could not transfer its paramount lordship to anybody. All 
it could do was to grant a fee simple by way of an infeudatory 
grant from its paramount ownership. That remains the case 
todav, though any such grantee will not now do homage and 
services for the land granted to him, but pay hard cash for it. 
Most of the vestiges of feudalism were finally swept away by the 
Tenures Abolition Act 1660.
The consequences of this are explained in a well-known 
textbook as follows:
'After 1290 thejeudal pyramid began to crumble. The number of 
mesne lordships could not be increased, evidence of existing mesne 
lordships gradually disappeared with the passage of time, and so most 
land came to be held directlyJrom the Crown.' (Megarry & Wade's 
Law of Real Property, 6th edn, 2000, 2-043)
There is now a strong presumption that every freeholder 
holds his land directly of the Crown as its tenant in chief. In 
1832, the Real Property Commissioners, in their Third Report on 
Real Property, commented that 'land is now most usually held 
immediately of the Crown'. By 1973, the Court of Appeal 
considered that:
'the possibility of the emergence of the mesne lord ... is one that is 
so remote that it may be wholly ignored for present purposes'. (Re 
Lowe's WT [1973] 1 WLR 882,886, per Russell LJ) 21
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However, the theoretical possibility of the existence of a 
mesne lord may explain why the Crown can own a freehold 
estate in land as well as having its paramount lordship. The 
freehold does not merge in the Crown's higher right. However, 
it is very questionable whether the Crown could grant to itselt a 
fee simple out of its paramount lordship. It is not easy to see 
how the Crown, one and indivisible as it is, can hold land as 
tenant in chief of itself (see the Scmlla case, as above, 801). That 
point is not, as it happens, one that is entirely academic. There 
are two cases where the existence of a mesne lordship is 
genuine. Those who own freeholds within one or other of the 
two royal Duchies of Cornwall and Lancaster hold them 
respectively of the Duke of Cornwall and of the Crown in right 
of the Duchy of Lancaster.
There is one curiosity about the Crown's paramount lordship. 
It has no generally accepted name in Lnglish law, though it has 
been called 'absolute property' (Real Property Commissioners, 
Third Report on Real Property (1832), p. 3) or 'dominium direction^ 
(see Attorney-General of Ontario v Mercer (1883) 8 App Cas 
767,772, referring to Co Litt la, Ib). It is also rather a curious 
form of ownership. As explained below, it is an ownership that 
can be without responsibility. One point that does need to be 
stressed is that the Crown's lordship is not an estate in land. 
English law developed, almost by accident, the doctrine of 
estates, that is, the idea that ownership in land can be divisible 
in time. The owner of an estate is not the owner of the land. He 
does not have dominium direction. He merely owns the right to 
enjoy the land for a period of time. Lven the largest estate   the 
fee simple absolute   may come to an end. Indeed it is that fact 
that underlies this article.
ESCHEAT
What is escheat?
If circumstances occur where there is no longer any feudal 
tenant, the land returns, by reason of tenure, to the feudal lord 
who created the tenure (Attorney-General of Ontario v Mercer, cited 
above, at 772). Escheat is the name given to this process by 
which the land reverts to the tenant's lord. As indicated above, 
outside the two royal Duchies, there is a presumption that a fee 
simple owner holds his land directly of the Crown and not of 
some intermediate lord. It follows that where escheat occurs, 
the tenant's fee simple ends. If he held that fee simple in either 
of the royal Duchies, the land will still be held in fee simple, but 
it will be the prior fee simple of the mesne lord, the Duke of 
Cornwall or the Crown in right of the Duchy of Lancaster (as 
the case may be). If, however, the tenant had held in fee simple 
of the Crown, the Crown holds the land in its paramount 
lordship. In each case, what has happened is the removal of one 
tier from the feudal pyramid. If the Crown subsequently grants 
that land afresh, it will do so by an infeudatory grant in fee 
simple. It is assumed that neither of the royal Duchies can make 
infeudatory grants. If they sell land that had escheated to them, 
presumably they do so by substitutionary grant instead. If that is 
correct, what would happen if that land were, once again, to 
escheat. Would it this time escheat to the Crown?
Escheat is only completed when the lord to whom it reverts 
either enters on the land or takes proceedings to recover it. At 
one time it was necessary for there to be an inquisition before
an escheat could take place. Indeed the Crown employed an 
'escheator' in every county to enforce its rights. Such 
inquisitions have long been obsolete and were formally 
abolished by the Crown Estate Act 1961, s. 8(4).
There is one other curiosity' about escheat that should be 
mentioned at this stage. For nearly 500 vears, there was a view,
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based on a dictum in Prior ofSpaldiny 's Case of 1467 that was cited 
in Coke on Littleton (Co Litt 13b), that the doctrine of escheat did 
not apply to a corporation. If a corporation was dissolved, any 
lands which it held reverted to the grantor. As Blackstone 
explained in his Commentaries:
'... the law doth annex a condition to every such arant, that if the 
corporation be dissolved, the arantor shall have the lands ayain, because 
the cause oj the arant faileth.'
This view must have been based on the sort of charitable and 
eleemosynary corporations that Coke would have known in the 
early 17th century, because it seems oddly inappropriate in 
relation to joint stock companies. It did not receive its quietus 
until the decision of the Court of Appeal in 1933 in Re Wells. 
Ironically, it is in the context of insolvent companies that the last 
vestiges of feudalism are causing the most difficulty. This is 
explained below.
When does escheat occur?
At one time the situations in which escheat occurred were 
fairly common. Two were of particular importance:
(1) Where a person was convicted of any felony other than 
treason; in cases of treason there was forfeiture to the Crown 
rather than escheat to the traitor's lord. Both this particular 
form of escheat and forfeiture were abolished by the 
Forfeiture Act 1870.
(2) An estate escheated if the owner died intestate and without 
heirs. This was abolished by the Administration of Estates 
Act, which made provision for the land to pass to the 
Crown or (where relevant) the Duchy of Cornwall or the 
Duchy of Lancaster as bona vacantia in lieu of any right to 
escheat. In such a case, the Crown (or Duchy) takes 
directly under the statutory provisions of the 1925 Act and 
not by any prerogative right (Re Mhchell [1954] Ch 525).
Although both the principal instances of escheat have now 
gone, it can still occur in a number of cases. All are associated 
with insolvency, and they have a history that goes back to the 
Bankruptcy Act 1869. Where a freehold is disclaimed, there is
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necessarily an escheat, and this is now firmly established by a line 
of authority going back to Re /Wercer and" Moore in 1880. It was 
restated most recently in 1995 by Stanley Burnton QC, sitting as 
a Deputy High Court Judge, in the leading modern case, ScmJJa 
Properties Z.tJ y Gesso Properties ^y/; IfJ [1995] BCC 793. There 
are three circumstances in which a freehold may be disclaimed:
(1) A trustee in bankruptcy may disclaim onerous property 
under s. 315 of the Jnso/yencyAct 1986. Onerous property 
is defined as 'any unprofitable contract' and 'any other 
property comprised in the bankrupt's estate which is 
unsaleable or not readily saleable, or is such that it may 
give rise to a liability to pay money or perform any other 
onerous act'.
(2) There is an analogous provision in s. 178 of the /nsoA-eng- 
Act 1986, by which a liquidator of a company that is being 
wound up may disclaim onerous property. Onerous 
property is defined in the same way.
(3) Under s. 654 of the Companies Act 1985, when a company 
is dissolved, all its property vests in the Crown or the 
Duchy of Cornwall or Lancaster as bona vacantia. 
However, s. 656 of the same Act permits the Crown, by 
means of a notice issued by the Treasury Solicitor (or 
relevant Duchy official) within 12 months of the date on 
which the company's property vested in it, to disclaim any 
such property. The effect of this is, of course, that, in the 
case of freehold land, the property then becomes 
ownerless and promptly escheats to the Crown. So what 
the Crown disclaims as bona vacantia it promptly re- 
acquires by way of escheat! These two provisions of the 
Companies Act 1985 are not new. They replicate equivalent 
sections in the Companies Act 1948. This rather curious 
result has been the subject of comment, both academic 
and judicial. In the Scm//a case (as above, 805), Stanley 
Burnton QC remarked that that it was 'difficult to see the 
object of these provisions in so far as they concern 
freeholds'.
There may in fact be a very good reason for the provision. It 
appears that the liability of the Crown for land that it receives as 
bona vacantia may be much more stringent than its liability for 
property that passes to it by way of escheat. When property 
passes to the Crown, whether as bona vacantia or by escheat, it 
is not freed from the burdens that bound it previously This is 
indeed well settled by authority (see, e.g. Attorney-Genera/ of 
Ontario y Afercer and Scm77a Properties ltd" y Gesso Properties (i)W) lfa\ 
as above) and is discussed further below. As will be apparent 
from what has been said, in most cases of escheat, the very 
reason why the property ends up in the hands of the Crown is 
because it is onerous and has therefore been disclaimed on the 
insolvency of a company or the bankruptcy of an individual. 
Curiously, the Crown's responsibility for property which passes 
to it as bona vacantia has never been definitively determined. 
However, in To^'y /McDowe/7 (1993) 69 P & CR 535 it was 
assumed without argument that, where a freehold reversion on 
a lease vested in the Crown as bona vacantia, the Crown was 
subject to the burden of the covenants of that lease. In that case 
the company which owned the reversion had been struck off the 
Register of Companies, and the Crown had not disclaimed the 
lease within 12 months under s. 656 of the Companies Act 1985. 
On the facts, the Crown was not liable anyway. It should be
noted that where property passes to the Crown as bona vacantia, 
it acquires the very estate which is subject to the burdens.
The position should be contrasted with a case of escheat. 
First, the freehold estate does not vest in the Crown: it is 
extinguished. Secondly, it has been accepted that the Crown is 
not liable provided that it does not enter and manage the 
property (see, e.g. 5cm77a Properties It j t Gesso Properties (7W7) ltd", 
above, at 804, 805; Re TVottin^nam Genera/ Cemetery Co [1955] Ch 
683; Attorney-Genera/ y Parsons [1956] AC 421). This is consistent 
with s. 40(4) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, which protects 
the Crown from any liability in tort in cases where property vests 
in it by virtue of any rule of law. That principle does not apply 
where it takes control of the property or enters into occupation 
of it.
PARADOX
There is an element of paradox in the present position. Most 
of the cases of escheat arise out of insolvent companies. ... for 
nearly 500 years prior to 193 3, it was thought that escheat had 
no application to corporations. Now it applies almost 
exclusively to corporations. Corporations are not, of course, 
institutions for which the feudal system was devised.
The assumption made in 7o^ y vWcDo(ve/7 that the Crown is 
liable for property it receives as bona vacantia but fails to 
disclaim may or may not be correct. However, the existence of 
that assumption may explain why, under s. 656 of the Companies 
/let 1985, the Treasury Solicitor can disclaim land received by 
the Crown as bona vacantia so that it can then escheat to the 
Crown. In practice, it is understood that this is precisely why, in 
any case of doubt, the Treasury Solicitor does now disclaim any 
property received as bona vacantia that may be onerous. The 
Treasury Solicitor's practice explains why there has been a sharp 
rise in the number of escheats of freehold. In 1995, there were 
200 such escheats every year. It may now be significantly more 
than that, though this impression is anecdotal and has not been 
verified.
There is an element of paradox in the present position. Most of 
the cases of escheat arise out of insolvent companies. As 
mentioned earlier, for nearly 500 years prior to 1933, it was 
thought that escheat had no application to corporations. Now it 
applies almost exclusively to corporations. Corporations are not, 
of course, institutions for which the feudal system was devised. 
However, paradox alone does not justify a change to the law What 
are the consequences of the retention of the Crown's paramount 
lordship and of escheat, and why is reform of the law desirable?
SOME AWKWARD CONSEQUENCES
The significant number of escheats has thrown into sharp 
relief the problems to which the doctrine and the existence of 
the Crown's paramount lordship give rise. Some of these 
difficulties are explained below.
The first is a problem that led the present author to explore 
this arcane area of the law in the first place. For some years the 
Law Commission and HM Land Registry have been working 
together to produce a new Land Registration Act that will 
replace the existing legislation and create a system of land
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registration built round electronic conveyancing. The Crown has 
considerable amounts of land which it holds in paramount 
lordship. Perhaps the largest such area is the foreshore around 
the coast of England and Wales. As the law stands, the Crown 
cannot register any land which it holds in paramount lordship. 
This is because only an estate in land can be registered under the 
land Registration A? 1925. In the $cm//a case, Stanley Burnton 
QC referred to this 'major, but unremarked, lacuna in the 
system of land registration'. This lacuna has not gone 
unremarked at HM Land Registry and it is worth spelling out its 
consequences. First, the Crown cannot apply for the registration 
of the title to the land which it holds in paramount lordship. 
This would not matter if it could grant to itself a fee simple, 
which it could then register. However, as has already been 
explained, the Crown probably cannot do that. This is because 
it cannot be both lord and tenant in chief. Secondly, when 
registered land escheats, whether to the Crown or to one of the 
Duchies, the title has to be closed and the land removed from 
the register. This is because the registered freehold no longer 
exists. At a time when the Registry is seeking to ensure that all 
land in England and Wales is registered, this is galling. It is also 
nonsensical. The Law Commission and the Land Registry have 
been in negotiation with the Crown for a considerable time to 
try to resolve these matters. However, any solutions are 
necessarily limited by the fact that our reforms are confined to 
registered land. We cannot abolish the feudal system.
DOCTRINE OF ESTATES
One point that does need to be stressed is that the Crown's 
lordship is not an estate in land. English law developed, 
almost by accident, the doctrine of estates, that is, the idea 
that ownership in land can be divisible in time. The owner of 
an estate is not the owner of tne /and. He does not have 
dominium direcfum. He merely owns the right to enjov the land 
for a period of time. Even the largest estate   the fee simple 
absolute   may come to an end.
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Secondly, the present law gives rise to some very difficult 
problems in practice. This may be illustrated by two cases, both 
decided in 1995.
The first is the leading modern decision on escheat, $cm//a 
Properties ltd * Gesso Properties ^K/^ ltd. A company called 
Grantborough Ltd was the landlord of a block of flats in Maida 
Yale. It had mortgaged its reversionary interest in the building. 
Grantborough went into insolvent liquidation, and the 
liquidator disclaimed the freehold. Some months later, the 
mortgagee, purporting to exercise its power of sale, entered into 
a contract to sell the land to the defendant. The issue before the 
court was whether this sale was a disposal of the kind that 
triggered the tenants' right to nominate a purchaser   in this 
case the plaintiff company   to whom the new landlord was 
required to sell his reversion under the provisions of the Aand/ord 
and Tenant /let 1987. Stanley Burnton QC, sitting as a Deputy 
High Court Judge, delivered a very scholarly judgment, holding 
that the sale by the mortgagee did trigger the provisions of the 
1987 Act. It is necessary to look in some detail at this judgment. 
The judge began with remarks that are highly pertinent:
'J was initia//y amused, 6ut u/timate/y dismayed, tAat tne ri^nfs of 
fne parties under a modem statute rejormin^ tne /aw of/and/ord and
tenant snou/d depend on tne resti^es ofjeuda/ /and Jaw. My dismay 
^rew as if became apparent fnaf my decision in tnis case inyo/ved an 
examination oy^undamcnta/ concepts o^ our /and /aw, and an 
examination of concepts and authorities dating &icA screra/ centuries.'
There were five main elements in his judgment, the first three 
of which have already been touched on:
(1) He held that the disclaimer terminated Grantborough's 
freehold interest.
(2) That disclaimer led to the escheat of the freehold estate to 
the Crown and that escheat occurred automatically. There 
was no tenant of the freehold, so that the Crown's 
paramount lordship was, as the judge put it, 'no longer 
encumbered by the freehold interest'. Furthermore, and 
following from this, the Crown did, not bv escheat alone,
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assume the liabilities of the freeholder. It was not a 
successor in title to the former freeholder.
(3) Although the freehold estate was determined, the 
subordinate interests in that freehold estate, such as the 
mortgage affecting it and the leases granted out of it, werec* o o c*
not determined. This was so, even though, as the judge 
admitted, 'it is ... difficult to understand how a 
subordinate interest, created out of a freehold, can survive 
the termination of the freehold interest'. The Crown did 
not, however, become subject to any personal obligation to 
pay the mortgage debt, because, as explained, it did not 
assume the liabilities of the former freeholder. These first 
three points seem correct in principle and accord with the 
weight of previous authority.
(4) The fourth point in the judgment is more difficult. The 
judge went on to hold that the mortgagee had power to sell 
the land subject to the mortgage, that it had done so, andJ o o * '
that the sale had vested a fee simple in the defendant 
purchaser. This is a convenient conclusion, but one that 
can only be reached by a most circuitous route. The 
relevant provisions of the law of rYoperty /let 1925 which 
confer on the mortgagee a power of sale, assume quite 
reasonably that he will convey the estate bound by the 
mortgage. But where there has been an escheat, that estate
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has disappeared. There are two alternatives therefore, 
neither of them satisfactory. First, the fee simple that was 
extinguished by the escheat revives when the mortgagee 
exercises its power of sale. That was in fact the view 
favoured by Deputy Judge Burnton. If that is correct, it 
leads to at least one odd consequence. If the title to the 
freehold was registered, it should be removed from the 
register on escheat. If, however, by exercising its power of 
sale, a mortgagee causes that extinguished freehold to 
revive, then presumably the title to it has to be reinstated 
on the register with the same title number as it had 
previously The second alternative is that, by exercising its 
power of sale, the mortgagee brings about an infeudatory 
grant of a new freehold from the Crown to the purchaser, 
even though the Crown is not a party to that transaction. 
That does of course look very strange, but it is arguably a 
more logical explanation than that of revival. If correct, it 
means that the purchaser acquires a wholly new title, but 
presumably subject to any encumbrances that bound the 
former freehold that were not overreached by the 
mortgagee's sale. It goes without saying that if the land had
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not escheated, but had passed to the Crown as bona 
vacantia, it would have been quite unnecessary to engage 
in such extraordinary intellectual contortions to reach the 
obvious conclusion.
(5) The fifth point in the judgment turned on whether, for the 
purposes of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987, the Crown 
had an interest in the land following disclaimer ol the 
freehold, even though it had not entered upon that land 
nor exercised any power of ownership over it. If the 
Crown did have such an interest, the sale by the mortgagee 
to the defendant would not have been one that triggered 
the tenants' right to nominate a purchaser to whom the 
defendant had to sell the land under the provisions of the 
1987 Act. Having regard to the mischief of the Act, Deputy 
Judge Burnton held that what the Crown had on 
disclaimer did not amount to an interest for the purposes 
of that Act. As a result, the defendant had to sell the land 
to the tenants' nominee.
The second case is the decision of Knox J in Hackney LBC v 
Crown Estate Commissioners (f995) 72 P & CR 233. The case 
concerned a Grade II listed Georgian property in Stoke 
Newington Church Street, which was left in a derelict state by 
its owrner, a Mr Rottenberg. The property was subject to a 
mortgage of some £133,000 in favour of the National 
Westminster Bank, and there were charges in favour of Hacknev
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Council under various regulatory statutes, such as the Prevention 
of Damage by Pests Act 1947 and the London Building Acts, which 
totalled some £14,000. The value of the property was reckoned 
to be a mere £10,000. Mr Rottenberg had been adjudicated 
bankrupt and his trustee in bankruptcy had disclaimed the 
freehold. The property had therefore escheated to the Crown, 
which was deliberatelv taking no action in relation to the 
property to ensure that it was not saddled with its liabilities. Nor 
was the National Westminster Bank taking any steps to enforce 
its mortgage. Under the Insolvency Act 1986, when a trustee in 
bankruptcy disclaims, it is open to a person with an interest in 
the property to apply to have the property vested in him, and the 
court can make such order as it thinks fit for such vesting. 
Hackney Council applied to the court for such an order and one 
which would exclude both the Crown Estate and the National 
Westminster Bank from any interest in the property. The case 
turned on whether the charges, which the Council had under 
the various regulatory statutes, gave it a sufficient interest to 
make such an application. Knox J held that they did and, in view 
of the passive attitude adopted by the Crown and the Bank, 
made the vesting order requested. Knox J gave his judgment on 
the assumption that, on escheat, Mr Rottenberg's freehold had 
vested in the Crown and that the Crown still had that freehold. 
It was that estate which he ordered to be vested in the Council. 
Of course, as will be apparent from what has been said earlier in 
this article, that assumption was incorrect: Mr Rottenberg's 
freehold had actually terminated. The effect of Knox J's order 
was, in substance, therefore, to make an infeudatory grant of 
land from the Crown to Hackney. Its effect, in other words, was 
rather like the sale by the mortgagee in the Scmlla case.
paramount lordship. Indeed this should be part of a much wider 
package of reforms to the law on land ownership and dealing by 
the Crown and the two Duchies. The mid-19th centurv 
legislation that governs the property dealings of the two Duchies 
(which are significant) is lamentably out of date and wholly 
inappropriate to a system of registered conveyancing that is 
likely to be conducted electronically in the very near future.
The reform proposed is that all the land that the Crown 
presently holds in right of its paramount lordship should for the 
future be held in fee simple. There would be no higher form of 
ownership and the Crown would then become bound by the 
statute Quia Emptores 1290 like everybody else. All forms of 
feudal disposition would be wholly void. In cases where property 
presently passes to the Crown by escheat, it would pass instead 
as bona vacantia. It would no longer be possible for the Treasury 
Solicitor to disclaim property received as bona vacantia. As the 
Crown would remain as a kind of legal 'dustbin' for unwanted 
property, it would be protected against claims in relation to any 
property received as bona vacantia provided that it neither took 
possession of the property' nor exercised rights of ownership 
over it.
In some ways the practical effect of these changes would be 
more apparent than real. They would certainly solve the 
problems that exist in relation to land registration. 
Furthermore, although the outcome in both the Scmlla and 
Hackney cases would have been the same had these reforms been 
implemented, it would have been considerably easier to reach 
the desired answer. Such changes would also be very much in 
line with what is happening in Scotland under the Abolition of 
Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Bill. Feudalism runs much deeper 
in Scotland than it does in England. However, that Bill will 
abolish it all, including the Crown's paramount rights. There will 
be those who suggest this is just a subtle form of republicanism 
that is intended to undermine the Crown's constitutional 
position. The Scottish Law Commission, in its 'Report on 
Abolition of the Feudal System', elegantly refuted this 
contention. It pointed out that the abolition of the feudal system 
of land tenure would have no effect on the Crown's prerogatives, 
and commented that:
"... it would be illogical, inconsistent and artificial to retain the 
highest element in thejeudal system of land tenure while abolishing the 
lower elements'.
It is precisely that illogical, inconsistent and artificial position 
that has existed in England and Wales for many years and that 
has created the present anomalies. It is time that we too 
abolished the highest element in the feudal system of land 
tenure. ©
REFORM
The present state of the law can be described rather charitably 
as nonsensical. In the present writer's personal view, the time 
has come to sweep away both escheat and the Crown's
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